A Pollution Attack to Public-key Watermarking Schemes by WU, Yongdong & DENG, Robert H.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
7-2012
A Pollution Attack to Public-key Watermarking
Schemes
Yongdong WU
Institute of InfoComm Research, Singapore
Robert H. DENG
Singapore Management University, robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ICME.2012.73
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Information Security Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WU, Yongdong and DENG, Robert H.. A Pollution Attack to Public-key Watermarking Schemes. (2012). IEEE International
Conference on Multimedia and Expo (ICME) 2012: 9-13 July 2012, Melbourne, Australia: Proceedings. 230-235. Research Collection
School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1651
A Pollution Attack to
Public-key Watermarking Schemes
Yongdong Wu
Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore
Email: wydong@i2r.a-star.edu.sg
Robert H. Deng
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Email: robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
Abstract—Public-key watermarking schemes are required to
possess two desirable properties: allowing everyone to determine
whether a watermark exists in an image or not and ensuring
high detection probability in case of malicious modiﬁcation. In
this paper we propose an attack which pollutes the watermark
embedded in an image with an optimal colored noise so as
to fool the detector of the underlying public-key watermarking
scheme. We further show how to apply the proposed pollution
attack to public-key subspace watermarking schemes to generate
pirated images of high quality but of low detection probability.
Our experiment results demonstrate that the proposed pollution
attack is very effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Subliminal channels were historically used for military and
political purposes. For example, in the 12th century, to over-
throw the Yuan dynasty which ruled China, Yuanzhang Zhu, a
leader of peasant uprising army, distributed a secret message
hidden in moon-cakes (sweet paste-ﬁlled cakes). The secret
note told people to stage a uprise in united revolt once they
saw a lantern burning in their village’s watchtower. On a mid-
autumn’s night (Aug. 15, lunar year), the lanterns were hoisted.
The Yuan dynasty was overthrown and Zhu became the ﬁrst
Emperor of the Ming dynasty. Nowadays, moon-cake is a
favorite food and an essential part of mid-autumn festival. Its
role of hiding secret messages is taken over by digital content
since the latter can be stored, transmitted and processed much
more efﬁciently. This technique of embedding messages in
digital content is referred to as digital watermarking. Based
on the detection methods, watermarking schemes are classiﬁed
into three categories 1 [1]: symmetric watermarking, weak
asymmetric watermarking, strong asymmetric watermarking or
public-key watermarking.
A symmetric watermarking scheme (e.g., [3]-[5]) requires
the detector to share secrets with the embedder. Hence, only
designated users can detect/extract the watermark from an
image. Technically, the embedder inserts a secret watermark
w into a host original image with another optional secret so
as to produce a watermarked image. To detect or extract
the watermark from an unknown image, the detector must
have the watermark and the optional secret. For example, the
well-known direct sequence spread spectrum watermarking [5]
1Indeed, it is controversial how watermarking schemes are classiﬁed. We
omit the publicly detectable watermarks (e.g.,[2]) based on zero-knowledge
as it requires multiple rounds of interaction between the detector and the
embedder.
adds a secret watermark w into some DCT (Discrete Cosine
Transform) coefﬁcients of an original image. Without the
secret w, the detector can not conﬁrm whether an unknown
image is watermarked or not. Besides being vulnerable to the
de-synchronization attack and the average attack, symmetric
watermarking schemes are also susceptible to the sensitivity
attack or the oracle attack [6].
A weak asymmetric watermarking scheme (e.g., [7]) enables
a detector to identify a watermark using a detecting key which
is derived from the embedding key with a one-way function.
In this case, a detector (e.g., a judge or authority) can answer
whether an unknown image is watermarked or not, but he can
not recover the original image. Thanks to the complicated non-
linear functions in the detecting method, Furon’s scheme [7]
greatly increases the complexity of the oracle attack.
A public-key watermarking (e.g., [8]-[15]) is a special
case of asymmetric watermarking as its detecting key is
known to all. Therefore, a public-key watermarking enables
anyone to determine the existence of a watermark using public
parameters. This merit is very useful in some applications
such as copyright protection. Unfortunately, because almost all
asymmetric watermarking methods are not constructed based
on hard mathematics problems as in cryptographic systems,
the public parameters leak some information on the embedding
secret, and may result in serious security ﬂaws, e.g., scheme
[8] is vulnerable to the removal attack [16], and schemes
[9][10] are vulnerable to the confusion attack [17].
With a correlation detecting strategy, the public-key sub-
space watermarking [11] is robust against the projection attack
by selecting a watermark which is parallel to the original im-
age feature; however, it generates a watermarked image which
is proportional to the original image [18]. Strictly speaking, the
subspace scheme [11] is not in the classic watermarking ﬁeld
but in the image searching ﬁeld. Boato et al. [13] improved
the subspace scheme [11] so that the watermarks can be se-
lected arbitrarily. They further provided a detailed construction
algorithm in [14] on their subspace watermarking method and
then applied it to multilevel ﬁngerprinting. The improvement
enables everyone to detect the embedded watermark from a
pirated image even in the presence of a certain amount of
image degradation due to image processing operations, such as
ﬁltering, JPEG compression and their combination. Moreover,
subspace watermarking schemes [13][14] are provably secure
against the projection attack which minimizes the difference
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between the pirated image and the watermarked one.
Furon et al. [1] proposed an attack principle to the public-
key watermarking methods assume that the watermark mes-
sage is very long (e.g., tens thousand bits in [9]). Thus, their at-
tack is not able to defeat any public-key watermarking scheme
whose watermark is short, e.g., subspace watermarking. In
this paper we propose a new attack called pollution attack by
adding optimal colored noise into the watermarked image. In
principle, it is not new to add noise to a watermarked image so
as to fool the watermark detector, and almost all the proposals
for robust watermarking schemes including [13]-[15] analyzed
the addition attack with white noise so as to investigate the
security of watermarking schemes. As a generation of scheme
[18], the present pollution attack generates the noise craftily
rather than randomly. Speciﬁcally, the noise is selected to
minimize the detection value given that the noise energy is
bounded. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
attack to the public-key watermarking schemes [13][14], an
experimental prototype is used to create pirated images which
are of high quality but of low watermark correlation. It shows
that the attack is effective.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
framework of the proposed pollution attack. To make the paper
self contained, Section III introduces the subspace watermark-
ing scheme [13][14]. Section IV illustrates the attack to the
subspace scheme. Section V describes our experiments and
results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. FRAMEWORK OF POLLUTION ATTACK
A. Model of public-key watermarking
To embed a watermark w into an original host Io so
as to generate a watermarked image Iw with a public-key
watermarking scheme, an embedder performs an embedding
operation ⊗ as Iw = Io ⊗ F0(w, Io), with some function
F0(w, Io).
To determine the existence of a watermark w in an unknown
image Iu, the detector will calculate a similarity measure as
λu = sim(F1(α, Iu),F2(α, Iu)),
where α, F1(·) and F2(·) are publicly known. Please note that
α may be related to the watermark w and the original image
Io. If λu > ε, the watermark w is identiﬁed; otherwise, no
watermark exists in the unknown image Iu.
B. Attack method
The pollution attack inserts noise p into a watermarked
content Iw so as to generate a pirated content Ip as Ip =
Iw ⊗ F0(p, Iw).
To fool the detector, the attacker should select the pollution
noise p which meets the following requirements:
R1: High ﬁdelity. The pirated image Ip should be perceptually
similar to the original image, or the watermarked image.
To evaluate the image quality, we adopt the PSNR (Peak
Signal to Noise Rate) as a ﬁdelity measurement in the
following although other quality measures are also appli-
cable.
R2: Low similarity λp. A detector can not identify the water-
mark from a pirated image Ip generated with the pollution
signal p if and only if λp is small.
R3: No spike modiﬁcation. The modiﬁcation value should be
limited to a small interval so as to eliminate pepper and
salt artifacts.
According to the above requirements, the attacker should solve⎧⎨
⎩
p = arg minx | sim(F1(α, Ix),F2(α, Ix)) |
PSNR(Ip − Iw) ≥ γ0
θl ≤ p ≤ θh
(1)
where PSNR(y) = 20(log10 255 − log10 ‖ y ‖), and γ0
is a pre-deﬁned threshold value to evaluate image quality
in dB (say, 40dB). The three formulas in Eq.(1) match the
requirements R1-R3 respectively.
C. Attack Rationale
Clearly, a watermarking method should guarantee that a
detector does not identify a watermark from the original
image; otherwise, the watermarked image has no additional
information in comparison with the original image. In other
words, the detector outputs
λo = sim(F1(α, Io),F2(α, Io)) < ε.
Denote Iminp as the pirated image constructed with p, accord-
ing to Eq.(1), the detector obtains
λminp = sim(F1(α, Iminp ),F2(α, Iminp ))
= min
x
sim(F1(α, Ix),F2(α, Ix))
< sim(F1(α, Io),F2(α, Io)) = λo < ε,
Therefore, the solution to Eq.(1) can be used to create the
pirated image which is of high quality but of low watermark
similarity. In the following, we will omit the superscript min
for simplicity if there is no ambiguity.
D. Discussion on high-dimension puzzle
According to Subsection II-C, the solution to Eq.(1) can
defeat the watermarking scheme. Therefore, the critical step
in the pollution attack is to solve Eq.(1) so as to obtain
the optimal colored noise p. Let n be the dimension of
a watermark. If n is very big, (e.g., n = 57600 in the
experiments of [15]), it may be too expensive to directly carry
out the computation in terms of time and space. To handle the
high-dimension problem, we can adopt any of the following
methods to reduce the dimensions:
(a) Simply ﬁx some elements of p as 0.
(b) Split the elements of p into groups, and all the group
members have the same values.
(c) Divide the high-dimension problem into several low-
dimension sub-problems and solve the sub-problems in
parallel or in sequence.
Apparently the value of p obtained via the above simpliﬁca-
tions may no longer be the optimal value. In this case, we
have to check the applicability of pagainst the requirements
R1-R3 so as to defeat the detector.
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III. SUBSPACE WATERMARKING SCHEME
This section will brief the subspace watermarking schemes.
For sake of consisteny, the following sections adopt the
notations of the original paper [13]. An integer n > 1 is the
dimension of the watermark and X is the feature space of
images (for instance, the space corresponding to the entries in
the top left corner of the DCT coefﬁcients).
A. Generating feature vector
In order to embed an arbitrary watermark w into an image
Io, the embedder transforms (e.g., DCT) an original image Io
to produce the transform-domain coefﬁcients, then re-arranges
the 2D coefﬁcients into a 1D column vector φo with a public
operator ξ(·). For example, ξ(·) means to scan left-right corner
of DCT matrix row by row.
Next, the embedder decomposes X into two orthogonal
subspaces W of dimension 2n and V of dimension m, and
further splits W into two orthogonal subspaces G and H of
dimension n with a secret random operator η(·). In other
words, the feature space X is divided into three subspaces G,
H and V , X = G⊕H⊕V . Technically, the embedder chooses a
(2n+m)×(2n+m) orth-normal matrix M (i.e., MT = M−1)
randomly. Then, he/she produces a (2n + m) ×m matrix V
which is a sub-matrix of M to form the basis of V . Similarly,
he/she produces (2n + m) × n matrix2 G (and H) which is
a random sub-matrix of M . Please note matrices G,H, V are
the ortho-normal bases of subspaces G,H,V respectively, and
they are orthogonal to each other. Hence, the original feature
vector φo ∈ X can be represented as
φo = ψo + σo,
where ψo ∈ W and σo ∈ V , and
ψo = Gs+ Ht,
for some n× 1 vectors s and t.
B. Embedding watermark into feature subspace
The embedding algorithm is deﬁned by
φw = φo + Gw, (2)
where w ∈ Rn is an arbitrary watermark vector or watermark
for short. Next, the embedder re-arranges 1D vector φw to a 2D
matrix with the public inverse operator ξ−1(·), and performs
inverse transform (e.g., IDCT) to produce the watermarked
image Iw.
In order to provide the capacity of public detection, the
embedder chooses a symmetric matrix A (i.e., AT = A)
satisfying
A(s+ w) = s+ w
and an orthogonal matrix B (i.e., BT = B−1) satisfying
Bt = μ(s+ w)
2From the items (2n + m)× 1 vector ψo, w ∈ Rn and Gw in Eq.(2), we
know that G consists of 2n+m rows and n columns. i.e., G is a (2n+m)×n
matrix.
with μ :=‖ t ‖ / ‖ s+ w ‖, and deﬁnes a matrix
D = AGT + μBHT .
Let q = s+w. The public key is α = (D,q, ξ) which is known
to everyone, but the secret G is known to the embedder only.
Those who are interested in the selection of A,B, please refer
to the original paper [13].
C. Detecting watermark in feature subspace
With the public key α, a detector will extract the feature
vector from an unknown image Iu as the embedder does in
Subsection III-B. Let φu be the extracted feature of the image
Iu, then the detector calculates the similarity
λu = sim(q, Dφu) =
(s+ w)TDφu
‖ s+ w ‖ · ‖ Dφu ‖ . (3)
If λu > ε for some predeﬁned threshold value 0 < ε  1, the
watermark w is conﬁrmed.
IV. POLLUTION ATTACK TO SUBSPACE WATERMARKING
Due to the non-linearity of embedding formulas, the sub-
space scheme [14] is robust against the attack of white noise
addition. For instance, in the experiments of the paper [14],
despite a watermarked image Iw is degraded greatly by adding
a white noise power up to 20dB, the detection probability is
still very high. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the subspace
scheme [14] is secure against all the addition attacks.
Unlike white noise generated randomly, the present colored
noise is generated with the public key α = (D,q, ξ). After the
optimal colored noise p is inserted into the watermarked image
Iw to produce a pirated image Ip, the similarity λp < ε, i.e.,
the detector can not conﬁrm the existence of the watermark w
from Ip.
A. Attack method
Given an watermarked image Iw, an attacker aims to gen-
erate a pirated image Ip such that both Ip and Iw are percep-
tually similar, but their watermark similarities are obviously
different, i.e., λp = sim(q, Dφp) < ε < sim(q, Dφe) = λw,
where φp and φe are the extracted feature vectors from Ip and
Iw respectively. To this end, the attacker generates a pirated
feature vector φp = φe + p with the extracted vector φe and
a pollution noise p based on the method described in Section
II. Speciﬁcally, in order to guarantee the similarity
λp = sim(q, Dφp) =
(s+ w)TDφp
‖ s+ w ‖ · ‖ Dφp ‖
=
(s+ w)TD(φe + p)
‖ s+ w ‖ · ‖ Dφp ‖
=
(s+ w)TDφe + (s+ w)TDp
‖ s+ w ‖ · ‖ Dφe + Dp ‖ < ε,
an attacker will utilize Eq.(1) to obtain the pollution signal p
by solving⎧⎨
⎩
p = arg minx | sim(q, D(φe + x)) |
PSNR(Ip − Iw) ≥ γ0
θl ≤ p ≤ θh
(4)
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Based on the theory of linear algebra, the attacker can ﬁnd at
least one solution of Eq.(4) which can defeat the watermark
detector (cf. Subsection IV-B).
In order to obtain the solution of Eq.(4) quickly, we prefer
to simplifying the formulas. In order to guarantee invisibility,
‖ s ‖	‖ p ‖, thus we have
(s+ w)TDφe = (1 + μ2)(s+ w)T (s+ w)	 (s+ w)TDp .
Therefore,
λp = sim(q, Dφp) =
(s+ w)TDφe + (s+ w)TDp
‖ s+ w ‖ · ‖ Dφe + Dp ‖
≈ (s+ w)
TDφe
‖ s+ w ‖ · ‖ Dφe + Dp ‖ (5)
Note that Eq.(5) does not hold all the time, but it is enough
to provide an approximate solution. As a result, Eq.(4) can be
replaced with its simpliﬁed form which merely maximizes the
denominator ‖ Dφe + Dp ‖ That is, the attacker can obtain
the pollution signal p by solving⎧⎨
⎩
p = arg maxx(‖ Dφe + Dx ‖)
PSNR(Ip − Iw) ≥ γ0
θl ≤ p ≤ θh
(6)
or a simpler one⎧⎨
⎩
p = arg maxx(‖ Dφe + Dx ‖)
PSNR(p) ≤ γ1
θl ≤ p ≤ θh
(7)
where γ1 is the predeﬁned noise energy threshold in dB
(say 20dB). Since Eq.(7) is a good approximation formula of
Eq.(4), its solution p usually sufﬁce to defeating the watermark
detector. Therefore, we elaborate the attack with Eq.(7) only.
B. Attack rationale
Following the principle that a watermark detector should not
identify the watermark from an original image, the public-key
subspace watermarking scheme [14] guarantees
sim(q, D(φe −Gw)) ≈ sim(s+ w, D(φw −Gw))
= sim(s+ w, Dφo) < ε.
For an image Ip generated with the solution p to Eq.(4), the
similarity is
λp = sim(q, D(φe + p))
= min
x
sim(s+ w, D(φe + x))
< sim(s+ w, D(φe −Gw)) < ε.
That is to say, the solution of Eq.(4) can fool the detector.
C. Attack process
Given an watermarked image Iw and the public detection
key α = (D,q, ξ), the attacker will
• Perform DCT on Iw, and select the coefﬁcients (i.e., top-
left corner of DCT) which are used for embedding.
• Re-organize the selected coefﬁcients with algorithm ξ to
form feature vector φe.
• Deﬁne a random x0 according to subsection IV-D.
• Obtain the pollution signal p by solving Eq.(7) in Sub-
section IV-A,
• Calculate φp = φe +p, and perform the inverse operator
ξ−1 to construct a DCT coefﬁcient matrix.
• Perform IDCT on the DCT coefﬁcient matrix so as to
obtain a matrix in image domain.
• Round each element of said image matrix to the closest
integer value in the designated interval (e.g. [0,255] for
8-bit gray image) so as to construct the pirated image Ip.
• If either λp > ε or the quality of image Ip is too low,
repeat the above steps by re-selecting the initialization
value x0 so as to ﬁnd other local extreme vector p.
As a result, the attacker produces a pirated image Ip which is
of high quality, but a detector fails to detect the watermark w
from Ip.
D. Selection of initialization value
Although a solution p can be derived from Eq.(7) by
randomly selecting an initialization value x0, it may not be
satisfactory in terms of the quality of the pirated image Ip
and watermark similarity λp because the solution is usually
a local extreme rather than global one. Therefore, an attacker
tries to select the initialization value which is close to the
global extreme point of Eq.(7).
An ideal initialization value is x0 = −Gw ∈ W because
this initialization value immediately produces a pirated image
Ip = Io which is of the highest quality and of low watermark
similarity. Of course, the attacker may not be so lucky to
guess the ideal value. But, he/she may attempt to select an
initialization value x0 ∈ W such that the local extreme is in
the subspace W . However, we assume that the attacker does
not know the subspace of W because he/she does not know
the watermark length n (Note that n is ﬁxed in [14] but n is a
variable in our attack. Hence, our assumption is weaker than
that of [14]). In order to select an initialization x0 ∈ W , the
attacker calculates
DTq = (GAT + μHBT )(s+ w)
= G(s+ w) + Ht = ψo ∈ W.
Although ψo ∈ W is known to all, we do not initialize
x0 = cψo for some scalar c due to two reasons: (1) c ∈ R is
only an one-dimension variable, thus the number of available
extreme points of Eq.(7) is much smaller than the total extreme
points. It means that the success chance is much small; (2)
the elements of ψo vary greatly, and hence the solution p may
result in spike noise.
On the other hand, φe = φo + r where r is a residue error
due to operations such as DCT/IDCT. Generally, ‖ r ‖ is very
small as shown in Fig.1. Next, the attacker computes
σe = φe −DTq = φo + r− ψo = σo + r ≈ σo ∈ V .
Therefore, to make sure that x0 is close to the subspace W
which is orthogonal to V , it is preferable that x0 is orthogonal
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Fig. 1. The empirical residue error r with mean 0.0468 and standard variance
0.5719 due to image processing operations such as DCT/IDCT.
to σe. Thus, one simple way is to set
x0(i) =
{
0 ψo(i) = 0 and σe(i) ≈ 0
a ∈R (θl, θh) otherwise
where z(i) denotes the ith element of vector z, and a is a
random number.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we tested the performance of the proposed
pollution attack in terms of detection probability and the
quality of pirated images.
A. Watermarking parameters
As the conﬁguration in the original paper [14], the random
watermark w is of length n = 200 with energy up to 20dB.
We further chose the feature space X corresponding to a
32 × 32 sub-matrix in the upper-left corner of the DCT of
the original image. Next, we split X into W , corresponding
to the upper-left 20×20 sub-matrix which are the perceptually
robust components, and its complementary subspace V which
are more susceptible to standard modiﬁcations of the image.
Finally, we constructed the ortho-normal matrices G and H ,
and further constructed matrices A and B with the methods
in [14]. Additionally, let ε = 0.1 since ε ≤ 0.1 is required for
low false-positive probability in [14]. For simplicity, we tested
the formula Eq.(7) only.
B. Implementation of pollution attack
According to the attack process outlined in Subsection IV-C,
the implementation code includes modules for (1) extracting
feature; (2) generating pollution vector; (3) tampering feature
vector and (4) re-constructing pirated image. We omit to
describe the modules (1) and (4) because they are the same
as those in the embedding process.
In the module for generating the pollution vector, let
γ1 = 20 (dB), and randomly select an initialization value
x0 ∈ W , then solve Eq.(7) with function fmincon(· · ·) in
the optimization toolbox of Matlab 7.0 as
θl=-20;
θh=20;
p = fmincon(min(− ‖ Dφe + Dx ‖),x0,· · ·,
θl,θh in Eq.(7), options);
where options can be used to decide the number of iterations
for solving Eq.(7). Alternatively, we may merge the constraints
of Eq.(6) and Eq.(7) for obtaining a good noise p.
If the optimal solution is not found due to the limitation of
options, we repeat the process. Technically, if
PSNR(Ip − Iw) < γ0 = 40dB,
we solve Eq.(7) with a new initialization value x0 such that
the pirated image is of good quality.
C. Experiment result
In the experiment, we selected 123 images randomly from
the image gallery. It took 817.95 minutes to pollute 123
watermarked images on a desktop Dell T3500 (CPU frequency
2.67GHz). Fig. 2 shows the PSNR of the polluted images, and
Fig. 3 is the detected similarity value from the polluted images,
the results of the experiment show that our attack can fool the
detector with a pirated image of good quality.
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Fig. 2. PSNR values of polluted images. Its mean is 40.9dB, and standard
deviation is 2.73dB.
Fig.4 and Fig.5 are examples for visually evaluating the
pirated image quality, where the PSNR of the watermarked
image Iw is 41.19dB while the PSNR of the pirated image Ip
is 37.44dB, but the similarity λp = 0.040 < 0.1 = ε. That is to
say, the pollution attack is more powerful than the projection
attack investigated in [14].
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a pollution attack which optimizes the in-
terference noise so as to decrease detection probability dra-
matically but only sacriﬁcing the image quality slightly. In
comparison with the sensitivity attack, it is much faster and
efﬁcient.
In our experiments, we observed that the non-linear em-
bedding/detecting functions may increase the robustness of
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Fig. 3. Similarity values λp detected from polluted images. Its mean is
0.051, and standard deviation is 0.019.
Fig. 4. Watermarked image Iw with PSNR 41.19dB.
a public-key watermarking scheme because the optimization
tools are not suitable for high-dimensional problems. Hence,
it may be a countermeasure to the pollution attack to design
public-key watermarking scheme with non-linear functions,
especially discontinuity functions. However, it is not easy
to design the non-linear functions because they increase the
complexity of detection function too.
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